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Abstract. Various company interactions can be described by networks, for instance
the ownership networks and the board membership networks. To understand the
ecosystem of companies, these interactions cannot be seen in isolation. For this purpose
we construct a new multilayer network of interactions between companies in Germany
and in the United Kingdom, combining ownership links, social ties through joint board
directors, R&D collaborations and stock correlations in one linked multiplex dataset.
We describe the features of this network and show there exists a non-trivial overlap
between these different types of networks, where the different types of connections
complement each other and make the overall structure more complex. This highlights
that corporate control, boardroom influence and other connections have different
structures and together make an even smaller corporate world than previously reported.
We have a first look at the relation between company performance and location in the
network structure.
1. Introduction
Networks, or graphs, are now widely used in economic and financial literature as they
represent a natural way to study connections and systemic effects [1, 2]. Under corporate
networks we consider all networks that describe interactions between companies. Over
the last two decades, studies in the broader field of economic and financial networks
studies of these systems have shown that the interconnectedness of the economic
and financial system is a main driver of (in)stability [3, 4, 5]. The topology of the
networks influences the resilience to shocks [6], and the evolution of mesoscale topological
structures could even indicate early-warning signals of a crisis [7].
On corporate networks, [8, 9] study spreading processes of influence on the network
of interlocking board members. Through board members that work for multiple
companies, decision-making spreads and this network has been shown to exhibit herd
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behaviour. These board interlocks can limit competition as they obstruct independent
decisions by boards [10].
Ownership networks constructed from (partial) ownership stakes of corporate
entities are another type of corporate networks. These networks have revealed a small
corporate world; a large concentration of ultimate ownership in a small group of core
companies in this network [11]. In [12], ownership networks are studied to find the role
of subsidiaries in control of large parent companies.
Also innovation dynamics have been studied by networks of R&D partnerships,
showing for example the effective outsourcing of research by big corporations to start-
ups [13]. On the financial side, corporate networks can be constructed from stock price
correlations. With techniques like network backbone extraction one can identify influen-
tial companies from these networks [14, 15]. These studies have shown how networks can
be used to study the dynamics of competition and innovation, or identify the influence
of the corporate topology one some notion of control and influence between corporations.
Most research until now studied these different types of corporate networks in
isolation. However, corporate networks are strongly interconnected; e.g. a cascading
effect between board members will influence stock market fluctuations and vice versa.
We therefore argue that these systems should be studied in parallel, not in isolation. In
this paper we will unravel the aggregate corporate network and characterise the topology
of the different layers of this system. To this end we construct a new multilayer network
of interactions between companies. We identify four main connections: ownership links,
social ties through board members, research collaborations, and stock correlations.
2. Data
We construct a unique multiplex dataset where we go beyond just listed companies and
include all registered companies in Germany and in the United Kingdom and Ireland.
The company information comes from the Amadeus database from Bureau van Dijk,
this includes stock prices, ownership details, names of directors in the boards, patent
data, and audit firm details. The data reflects the state of all registered companies
in those countries as in February 2018. Daily stock prices are collected in the 2-year
window before this date.
We select companies registered in Germany with at least 10 employees (if employee
data is not available this is estimated by taking the industry average based on revenue).
For the United Kingdom and Ireland we study all listed companies from data that
comprises 1312 companies that are listed and registered within these countries.
Networks with links of different types are described by multilayer networks, where
every layer corresponds to the interaction graph of a single type of interaction. The
subset of these networks where there are no edges between nodes in different layers,
is also called multiplex networks. In [17], the authors show that multilayer graph
analysis in various applications gives a better representation than aggregate or single
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Figure 1: Multilayer network of listed German companies showing: cross-stockholding
ownership network, joint board directors network, research interactions, minimum
spanning tree of stock correlations and the aggregate. We show a multiplex layout; the
position of nodes is the same in all layers, but isolated nodes in a layer are not shown.
Nodes are coloured by their MultiRank centrality in the multiplex. The visualization
illustrates clearly that these interactions have different structures. All multiplex figures
are created with the MuxViz software [16].
layer networks. This is driven by the fact that there are often multiple drivers of an
effect, and as these are often connected but have different structures, the single or
aggregate layers might under- or overestimate the network effects.
2.1. Networks
• Ownership. Ownership ties are constructed from shareholder data [18]. We are
interested in cross-shareholding for companies in our dataset, i.e. instances where
the shareholder of a company is of itself a company in our data. We thus disregards
all shareholders that are foreign or individuals.
Ownership can be defined in various ways. Strict ownership is usually set as stake
of > 50%. For control and influence a smaller stake (5, 10, 20%) is often considered
sufficient [19, 20]. Peer effects of ownership can be robust under these different
definitions [11]. We construct an edge between companies i and j when company i
has a stake ≥ 10% in company j following [11].
• Board of Directors. The board membership network describes companies that are
linked through directors. The board makes strategic decisions for the company.
Decision making can spread through directors that sit in multiple boards [8]. In
this network an edge exists between company i and j when the boards of directors
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Ownership Board Research Stock Aggregate
German Nodes 49385 90690 3744 105005
companies Edges 38594 308123 8420 335213
Average Degree 1.56 6.80 4.50 6.38
Assortativity -0.03 1.00 -0.18 0.98
Germany listed Nodes 86 330 64 535 535
companies only Edges 54 504 212 534 1214
Average Degree 1.26 3.05 6.62 2.00 4.54
Assortativity -0.18 0.48 -0.42 -0.03 0.29
UK listed Nodes 301 1043 25 1312 1312
companies Edges 293 2778 25 1311 4354
Average Degree 1.95 5.33 2.00 2.00 6.64
Assortativity -0.51 0.69 -0.19 -0.21 -0.11
Table 1: Multiplex Descriptive Statistics
of company i and company j have a least one director in common. This can also be
seen as the company-side projection of the bipartite network of directors and the
companies they serve. We rely on unique person identifiers in the database, which
prevents any problem with name disambiguation.
• Research. From patent application data we obtain two kinds of links; (i) companies
that are joint assignees (owners) of a patent and (ii) inventors that worked for
multiple companies at the same time. The first case is a clear sign of joint research
which led to the joint patent application. Following other studies on R&D networks
[21, 22], we also exploit inventors that appear on multiple patents with different
assignee companies, i.e. inventors working with multiple companies. This can be
used as a proxy of joint research [23]. Because of the long term characteristics of
joint research projects, we use the patent application data between 2016-2018.
• Stock Correlations. From stock price time-series we can identify significant relations
between stocks. Here we follow earlier studies [15, 24], constructing a minimum
spanning tree to identify a backbone network of important links. The method
extracts a backbone network from pairwise correlations between the time-series.
The pairwise correlations are computed on the logarithmic daily returns of a stock
price. For stock s with price p, the daily log-return is : rst = log p
s
t−log pst−1. We use
a 2-year window of the stock time-series in order to have ns < nt, for a well behaved
multiple pairwise correlation matrix. The 2-year window in combination with daily
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returns, rather than daily closing prices make the time series more comparable and
diminishes effects of long term trends. In a further regression exercise we also use
the full set of pairwise correlations without extracting the backbone network.
3. Network Topology
In this section we first describe the network topology of the various company-to-company
interactions. We then discuss the significance of the multiplex structure and show that
all layers convey different structural information.
3.1. Layer Descriptions
The network of German companies results in a multiplex of over a hundred thousand
companies, where the layers describing different types of company interactions are all
described by different networks statistics. For all German companies that have at
least one connection to another company, we obtain an aggregate network of 105005
companies. 89% of the companies are connected through a joint board member, and
slightly less than half of the companies are connected through an ownership link, see
Table 1. The network of research interactions is much smaller compared to the other
layers, but with an average degree of 4.5, this is more densely connected than the
ownership topology which has only 1.26. The largest contribution of links in the
aggregate network comes from board interactions. From the assortatvity of the layers,
the tendency of nodes to connect with nodes of the same size (degree), we see that while
through board members companies connect very much to similar size companies, this
effect is non existing in the ownership network. In the research network assortativity
is negative, -0.51, driven by larger companies that collaborate with smaller companies
(start-ups).
3.1.1. Listed Companies The subset of companies that are listed has similar
characteristics to the full network. For listed companies we also have stock market price
interactions. When we compare the characteristics of the subset of listed companies to
those of the whole system, many of the dynamics between the layers are the same. This
is in principle not surprising, however, in this case the subset comprises of a particular
set of the most ’important’ and mainly biggest companies in terms of turnover etc.
Nearly all companies are connected by board members, showing the potentially large
influence of this more informal network.
3.1.2. United Kingdom For listed firms in the UK we observe a reasonable similarity
in of the network with the German network, in terms of the assortativity of the different
interactions and the relative sizes of the different layers. Main differences are a more
dense board membership network, with an average degree of 5, less research interactions,
as the UK economy in general is more geared towards less research intensive services
than the German economy, see Table 1.
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(a) Node overlap of German multiplex
Ownership Board Research Stock
Ownership 1
Board 0.11 1
Research 0.02 0.11 1
Stock 0.16 0.62 0.12 1
(b) Edge overlap of German multiplex
Ownership Board Research Stock
Ownership 1
Board 0.02 1
Research 0 0.06 1
Stock 0.01 0.03 0.03 1
(c) Node overlap of UK multiplex
Ownership Board Research Stock
Ownership 1
Board 0.23 1
Research 0.02 0.02 1
Stock 0.80 0.23 0.02 1
(d) Edge overlap of UK multiplex
Ownership Board Research Stock
Ownership 1
Board 0.002 1
Research 0.001 0.006 1
Stock 0.004 0.005 0.003 1
Table 2: Layer overlap. Overlap of nodes and edges between the layers, as measured
by the fraction of nodes/edges which appear in both layers. Edge overlap is small but
non-zero, indicating layers are complementary.
3.2. Multilayer Structure
In the previous section we described the topology of the isolated layers, but we are
interested in these interactions in parallel. We want to understand whether we need to
distinguish these different interactions, or whether the aggregate would suffice. As the
multiplex literature is a very recent one, there is not one established method to evaluate
this question of the relevance of the multilayer structure. Therefore we answer this with
three different available methods for the analysis of the multiplex structure:
(i) the node and edge overlap of the layers;
(ii) the structural reducibility;
(iii) a network regression.
All these three methods on their own will show that all layers are significant and that
the multiplex representation has an added value.
3.2.1. Node and Edge Overlap Node and edge overlap shows similarities between the
layers and the level of connectedness. The node and edge overlap in two networks is
measured by the fractions nodes (edges) that occur in both networks over the total
number of nodes (edges). Results in Table 2 indicate that all layers are connected but
not overlapping in edges as we observe a low, but non-zero edge overlap. This holds
both for the German companies and the UK companies. The fact that for all pairs of
layers we low edge overlap shows that these corporate networks do not simply overlap.
3.2.2. Structural Reducibility Structural reducibility is a recently introduced measure
[17] for multilayer network that indicates whether pairs of layers can be aggregated based
on redundant information. The information encoded in a network can be quantified
by the entropy. The structural reducibility quantity calculates the relative entropy
between a network of multiple layers and its aggregate. By analysing whether some
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layers can be aggregated, without loosing distinguishability from the aggregate, one can
find the configuration of the multilayer that maximises the information in the system.
The information is quantified by the entropy (Von Neumann entropy) of the network.
Formally we maximise the value
q(G) = 1− combined entropy of the multilayerentropy of the aggregated network (1)
See the Appendix for details and the formal introduction of this method. Calculating the
structural reducibility quality between all the layers, we find the the optimal structure
is the multilayer with all original layers present, see Figure 2. This indicates that all
layers convey different structural information.
3.2.3. Multiplex Network Regression A third way we can probe the significance of
the different layers is by means of a regression. The multiplex network describes
different types of interaction between the actors. With a regression we can test the
explanatory power of these interactions for an observed interaction. For sparse networks
a classic regression, where observations are formed by all possible edges (all adjacency
matrix entries), one would regress with many zero entries. We use a newly proposed
method more suited for network regressions that uses a graph null model to look at
significant links. It is well known that interactions described by a network structure
should be tested against a null model, to see which part of the observed network can be
explained by randomness. With a null model we answer the question: out of the many
combinations the network structure could possible be configured, how (im)probable is
the empirically observed structure? This way we can filter observed interactions that
arise from randomness from combinatorial factors.
To this end we use a recently introduced network regression model that uses a
generalised hypergeometric graph ensemble as the graph null model. This regression
estimates the influence of a layer of the multiplex and, using the null model, tests
the statistical significance of the layer structure on observed interactions. A detailed
explanation can be found in [25]. We setup a regression to see if the stock correlations
can (in part) be explained by the network structures:
stock correlation ∼ ownership ties + board ties + research ties (2)
As dependent variable we take the pairwise correlation values between all stock time-
series and scale them to integer values in the interval [0, 100], as the multiplex regression
model allows for the dependent variable to be weighted (positive, integer) - See [25] for
details on this regression method. The dependent variables are the unweighted network
structures; the Ownership network, the Board network and the Research network. The
regression identifies all dependent variables to be significant in explaining the stock cor-
relations, see Table 3.
On the basis of the above we conclude that the different layers have distinct
information to convey. The three different methods have shown the significance of
The Multilayer Structure of Corporate Networks 8
Figure 2: Structural reducibility of the multiplex based on entropy of the layers. The
relative entropy q measures the structural information of the multilayer compared to its
aggregate. The larger q, the more distinguishable the multiplex is from the aggregate
network. When none of the layers are aggregated the entropy is maximal. I.e. none of
the layers are structurally reducible based on redundant structural information measured
from the entropy. For a complete description we do require all information encoded in
all layers/types of interactions.
German stock correlations UK stock correlations
Coef. SE Coef. SE
Board 0.101 *** 0.044 ***
Ownership 0.079 *** 0.070 ***
Research 0.112 *** 0.195 ***
* p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.
Table 3: Multiplex network regression on pairwise stock correlations. All layers are
found significant independent variables for explaining the stock correlations.
all layers in the multiplex. These results highlight the different channels of influence
between companies have very different structures. The complementary characteristics of
the different layers show that the corporate world is an even smaller one than previously
reported based on the studies of ownership [26] or the board membership network [9].
3.3. Network dynamics
We now take the first steps to explorer the dynamics of this multilayer structure,
and analyse how the network structure is related to company properties. The small
world network that we described before is characterised by the presence of hub nodes.
Such core nodes act as connectors of different parts of the network. We calculate the
centrality of the nodes within the separate layers, and with the MultiRank centrality [27]
quantify the node prominence in the multiplex. We regress node centralities on company
characteristics like revenue, stock return, revenue growth, and the Sharpe ratio of the
stock returns, in an ordinary least squares regression. We find that centrality in the
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multiplex is significantly correlated to revenue of the companies - see the appendix
for more details. Larger companies, as measures by revenue, are more central in the
network. The result is not necessarily surprising [11], as larger companies have more
resources to form connections, like subsidiaries and R&D collaborations.
Now, we look at the position of the companies in the network, related to the stock
performances. We measure stock performance with the Sharpe ratio instead of the direct
stock returns. This ratio evaluates mean returns compensated for (high) volatility of the
stock. A high Sharpe ratio corresponds to a high return and low volatility: a consistent
steady high return. The Sharpe ratio is calculated from the returns of a portfolio of
stocks r as:
S =
〈d〉
σd
, (3)
where d = rportfolio − rrisk free. We take the risk free return on capital as zero (an
assumption which is valid as the return on German governmental bonds is currently
zero, or even negative). We calculate the centrality also in the multiplex excluding the
stock interactions layer.
Calculating the Sharpe ratio of the portfolio of the highest ranked quantile, using
the MultiRank centrality ranking on the multilayer network, we find the core companies
perform significantly better compared to the rest of the network. In fact, we find a
Sharpe ratio for the portfolio of companies in the core of 0.37, while only 0.18 for the
rest of the network for the German multiplex (0.21 versus 0.07 for the UK multiplex).
However, this effect seems mostly driven by the companies with largest revenue, rather
than uniformly by all companies in the core. These preliminary results on the dynamics
behind the multiplex structure indicate a relation between company performance and
network formation, and invite more research on this topic.
4. Conclusion
In this paper we have described a uniquely compiled dataset which combines various
known company-to-company interaction networks into one single multilayer structure.
The layers of this system describe different types of interactions between the same set of
companies. We have included ownership ties, social ties through joint board members,
R&D collaborations, and stock correlations. With three separate methods we show the
significance of the multiplex structure. Node and edge overlap highlights that different
types of ties connect different sets of players; i.e. the structures are not overlapping
and the layers complement each other. The structural reducibility quality was used to
show that all layers are structurally different and irreducible from an information theory
perspective. In the third method we used a regression model to estimate the explanatory
power of the multiplex structure on all pairwise stock correlations. The independent
variables of network structures of ownership network, board membership network and
R&D network were all found to be significant estimators of the structure in the stock
correlations.
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These three methods confirmed that the multiplex representation is different to the
single layers or the aggregate, and that these interactions have different structures. For
company interactions this indicates studies of peer effects of control should take these
multiple connections into account. We evaluate the characteristics of companies related
to the multiplex structure. These initial results indicate a relation between company
performance and multiplex centrality.
Our results show that the corporate world is an even smaller world than the small
world already described by various previous studies on corporate control and studies of
the ’old boys network’ of board rooms. The significance of the different layers of the
corporate multiplex invite more research on the interconnectedness of diverse economic
and financial networks.
Appendix A. Structural reducibility framework
The structural reducibility measure evaluates is some layers can be aggregated without
loss of distinguishability from the aggregate [17]. Let our multiplex of four layers be,
A = {A1, A2, A3, A4}, where Aα denotes the adjacency matrix of layer α. The Von
Neumann entropy of this multiplex is H(A) = 4∑
1
hAα , where hAα = −
N∑
i=1
λi log2(λi), the
Von Neumann entropy of N ×N layer α with eigenvalues λ. We now sum two or more
of the layers find multiplex A˜. The measure we are maximizing, the relative entropy is
q(A˜) = 1− H(A˜)
hA
, where hA is the entropy of the aggregate of all layers.
Appendix B. Node properties regression
To establish properties of nodes that can drive the network dynamics we perform a
simple regression of company properties to see which of these variables might drive
the node ranking in the network. We include company characteristics revenue, revenue
growth, average log return, Sharpe ratio in an ordinary least squares regression:
node ranking ∼ 〈revenue〉+〈revenue growth〉+〈return〉+〈Sharpe ratio〉.(B.1)
We find that only revenue is a significant independent value of the node ranking. This
results is robust for the multiplex ranking (with and without the stock interactions
layer) and with the node centrality (PageRank) from the single layers.
Appendix C. Applications
We illustrate the use of this multiplex approach with two further examples of an
interactions network of two companies before a partial take-over, and a network structure
that shows clustering around audit firm choice.
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Appendix C.1. Interwoven relations before a partial takeover: EON - RWE
The interactions between two German energy companies reveal different interactions
throughout the network. Company mergers and takeovers are sometimes preceded by
collaborations between the companies. From our network point of view these relations
can be visualised, to help understand how interwoven companies are, but also to
highlight possible conflicts of interest. As an example of the this we look at the recent
deal between German energy conglomerates EON and RWE. In July 2018 the two
companies reached a deal where EON will acquire the Innogy subsidiary of RWE, and
RWE will end up with a significant stake in EON [28]. Our multiplex dataset shows
a snapshot of the network from early 2018, well before the announcement of this deal.
However we can observe a number of directors which are working both for EON and the
RWE subsidiary, as well as a number of ownership ties between subsidiaries of the two
companies, see Figure C1.
Figure C1: The multiplex network of Ownership and Board interactions between
German energy conglomerates EON and RWE shows the firms are interconnected well
before a partial takeover took place. This network shows relations months before the
announcement of a deal in which EON (red) agreed to acquire the Innogy subsidiary
(green) of RWE (blue). The two larger nodes are the stock market traded parent entities.
Differences in connections in the two visualised layers show certain subsidiaries of EON
that are connected to EON by ownership, but that are solely connected through common
directors with RWE. Differences in these layers show the insight to gain from multiple
types of corporate ties.
Appendix C.2. Clustered auditor choice
Peer effects, whether through the old boys boardroom network or through herd
behaviour, can steer decision making. All exchange traded companies must have their
finances checked every year by an auditor. Big companies usually choose for one
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of the ’Big Four’ audit firms; KPMG, Ernst&Young, PriceWaterhouseCoopers, and
Deloitte. While there is a choice, a recent Financial Times article explains that there
are limitations to this free choice [29]. Audit firms also do consultancy jobs for firms,
which presents a conflict for also auditing the books. There are also examples where
directors of a company are former partners at auditing firms, and therefore creating a
conflict of interest with that auditing firm [29]. The same goes for the relations between
companies that we have described in our multiplex network. We can ask whether there
is any relation between existing connections between companies and their choice of an
auditing firm. With our multiplex network, a simple test is to check whether connected
nodes (companies) are more likely to use the same audit firm. For a given audit firm we
calculate for all nodes, n, the average number of neighbours that use that audit firm.
We then compare this average fraction of neighbours which uses an audit firm for all
nodes, with the fraction for just the nodes that use that audit firm:
fn =
∑
n
neighbors with audit firm x
total number of neighbors (C.1)
fnauditor
=
∑
nwith audit firm x
neighbors with audit firm x
total number of neighbors (C.2)
We calculate these fractions for each of the big four audit firms individually. We find
that companies which use the same audit firm are more connected among themselves
than to other firms, especially for connections from the Board membership network.
This suggests that there is a certain clustering of audit firm choice for connected firms.
This effect might be due to other factors, as the co-evolution of the node attribute
values (audit firm) and the network structure. The point is that results can be different
on different layers of the multiplex and to show how a multiplex network can help in
evaluating such questions.
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